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1 It  is  a  historical  truism  that  every  thinker  who  made  any  impact  on  the  field  of
philosophy also received his or her fair share of criticism, and it would therefore be
surprising if Richard Rorty, at one time “the most quoted American philosopher,” did
not.1 But to merely say that he did would be an understatement. For Rorty happened to
belong to the exclusive club of thinkers whose reception consists mostly of attacks. To
be fair, throughout his career, he held academic positions at America’s top institutions,
published his work with top presses and in top journals, was a sought-after keynote
speaker, an op-ed author for the New York Times,  and even had a certain number of
followers and sympathizers. But their number had always been small in comparison to
the  number  of  those  following other  philosophical  superstars,  including such bête-
noirs as Foucault or Derrida. No field was overtaken by his ideas, there was no army of
Rortyans to support him, and most of the quotations that made him the most quoted
American philosopher  also  made him the  most  criticized  one.  Practically  all  of  his
commentators recognized his originality, imagination, and erudition, and practically
all of them also thought him completely wrong, independently of which philosophical
quarter they represented. 
2 As  a  philosopher,  Rorty  straddled  the  territory  in  between  three  philosophical
traditions: pragmatism, continental, and analytic philosophy, but he was embraced in
none and criticized by representatives of all three, including by heavy-hitters such as
Hilary Putnam, Nancy Fraser, and John Searle. As a public intellectual, he was a vocal
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supporter of the ideal of social justice, which he shared with the contemporary Left, but
he  was  at  the  same  time  fiercely  critical of  identity  politics,  a  position  usually
associated with the right pole of the political spectrum. Partly as a result of this, he was
again embraced neither by the Left, nor the Right, nor the Center, nor by any other
significant part of the spectrum. 
3 All this is said here, not in order to romanticize Rorty into a philosophical or political
martyr or an “unhonored prophet of some social or intellectual revolution whose time
has yet to come,”2 but to stress the boldness of the project taken on by Curtis’s in this
new book, and to stress also the fact that attempts to defend Rorty such as his do not
necessarily have to be insular projects that only committed Rortyans can profit from.
Rorty was, after all, a widely-known thinker who was widely-criticized, often by other
widely-known thinkers and in the context of some of the most-widely known debates of
his  time.  In  the  right  hands,  a  defense  of  Rorty  could  then  become  something  of
interest to anyone interested in the philosophical debates that rocked the philosophical
world  in  the  late-twentieth  century,  some  of  which  in  many  ways  have  set  the
coordinates for the current ones. Curtis seizes that opportunity with very good results,
focusing on the debate concerning whether liberalism can accommodate “the challenge
of pluralism,” (9, 12). His book is actually, by his own admission, an attempt to take a
stand against those who think that it  cannot and that it  therefore has to go (ix).  If
Curtis  makes so much of  defending Rorty,  this  is  mainly because he thinks Rorty’s
version of liberalism is best-suited to fend off the aforementioned criticisms – and the
best version overall. 
4 Consistent with that goal, Curtis begins his book by laying out in the introduction what
the challenge of pluralism consists in and explaining why other attempts by liberal
theorists to address it have proven ineffectual. The challenge is, roughly, that pace its
founding fathers, rather than being an ethically and culturally neutral framework that
springs from the dictates of universal reason and allows potentially all ways of life to
peacefully coexist in society, liberalism is itself an ethically-charged, culturally specific
way of life, and as such it is often incompatible with some of the ways of life which it is
in principle supposed to help flourish and which are generally no less “reasonable”
than liberalism itself. To argue, then, that contemporary societies should be liberal is to
risk appearing “intolerant, and therefore oppressive, imperialistic, and ethnocentric”
(21).
5 The  most  popular  way  to  save  liberalism  from  such  accusations  has  been,  quite
predictably, to purge it as much as possible of anything culturally or ethically specific:
to thin it out so as it could become as compatible as possible with all the known ways of
human  life.  The  results  include  conceptions  such  as  political  liberalism  and  modus
vivendi liberalism.  The  problem  with  both,  argues  Curtis,  is  that  they  are  unstable
between a position in which their supposedly thinned-out liberal procedures work but
only at the price of smuggling in some thick cultural or ethical content through the
back door, and one where the process of purification is completed but only at the cost
of making that content-free position no longer a version of liberalism. 
6 Unhappy with a choice between hypocrisy and a de facto abandonment of liberalism,
Curtis  chooses  to  bite  the  bullet.  He  frankly  admits  that  liberalism is  a  culturally-
specific way of life, and that there is no other way to follow it than to actually live it,
something  which  demands  developing  a  specific  set  of  dispositions,  habits,  and
attitudes, and cannot be achieved merely by abiding to a set of “abstract principles.”
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The only honest and workable form of liberalism turns out to be, at least for Curtis,
virtue liberalism – of the kind of proposed by Stephen Macedo and Rorty himself. 
7 While there are many specific features of Rorty’s brand of virtue liberalism that Curtis
finds appealing, the one which stands out in light of the pluralist challenge is that while
Rorty has no qualms about declaring his preferred liberal ethos superior to any other
way  of  life,  he  does  not  try  to  argue  that  his  preference  is  backed  by  universal,
transcultural rationality. He abandons “the traditional philosophical quest for neutral
foundations  for  liberalism,  and  […]  boldly  admit[s]  that  liberalism  is  indeed
‘ethnocentric’:  an  idiosyncratic,  parochial  cultural  development  of  Enlightenment
Europe, and no less defensible for being that” (21). That Rorty is able to do so (to be a
firm believer in liberalism while at the same time accepting its contingency), is made
possible  by his  “anti-authoritarianism,” a  position he developed outside of  political
philosophy per se, as a result of his interventions in the philosophy of language and
epistemology.
8 Chapter 1 cursorily surveys that work, discussing its roots in classical pragmatism, the
work of Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Sellars as well its critical reception among Rorty’s
contemporaries  (McDowell  and  Putnam)  in  order  to  provide  some  background  for
understanding what anti-authoritarianism amounts to.  And what it  amounts to is  a
recasting of Rorty’s anti-representationalism where the rejection of the view that truth
consists in correspondence to the way things really are is framed as “a protest against
the idea that human beings must humble themselves before something non-human,
whether the Will of God or the Intrinsic Nature of Reality.”3 According to Rorty, the
epistemic imperative of justifying one’s beliefs once and for all (whether in science,
politics,  morality,  or in any other domain of  human life)  by checking them against
“reality as it is in itself,” is a mere expression of an atavistic “sado-masochistic” urge to
kneel before a non-human authority. Anti-authoritarians, on the contrary, do not feel
that  urge,  which  is  because  they  do  not  believe  in  such  authorities.  For  them,
justification is a “social game” whose “constraints are contingent and practice-based,
as opposed to necessary and metaphysical” (53). The only epistemic authority they can
imagine and recognize is the community of their “fellow-inquirers.”4
9 Once he has laid out how he understands the anti-authoritarian component of Rorty’s
anti-authoritarian liberalism, Curtis turns, in Chapter 2, to the liberalism part per se.
What  Rorty  shares  with  most  other  liberals  is  his  ideal  of  society  as  one  where
“discussion of public affairs will revolve around (1) how to balance the needs for peace,
wealth, and freedom when conditions require that one of these goals be sacrificed to
one of the others; and (2) how to equalize opportunities for self-creation and then leave
people alone to use, or neglect, their opportunities,”5 and what he shares in particular
with virtue liberals, as Curtis quite convincingly shows, is his emphasis that that ideal
cannot be achieved without the citizens of  liberal  society adopting a  certain set  of
attitudes and dispositions. What Rorty adds to the typical catalogue of liberal virtues,
and what at the same time connects his political philosophy to his interventions in
epistemology  and  metaphilosophy,  is  what  Curtis  calls  “the  liberal  civic  virtue  of
irony,” (89) and which is best described as internalized anti-authoritarianism. 
10 Rorty’s famed liberal utopia is, then, a society that (a) exemplifies the aforementioned
ideal  common  to  most  liberals;  and  (b)  whose  citizens  are,  in  addition,
commonsensically anti-authoritarian. It is precisely this meta-virtue that allows Rorty’s
ideal citizens to both be committed to liberalism and to admit that that commitment is
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contingent,  as contingent as any other political commitment for that matter.  When
confronted with somebody whose commitments conflict with their own, such liberals
do  not  invoke  any  non-human  authority  that  would  allegedly  stand  on  their  side,
providing them with a metaphysical seal of approval, nor do they a priori abstain from
trying to convince their interlocutor to liberalism on the grounds that there is no non-
contingent  ground  on  which  this  can  be  done.  Instead,  they  simply  invite  her  to
imagine what being a liberal might be, and to see if she likes it. Their civic virtue of
irony  provides  them  with  “critical  open-mindedness”;  that  is,  “a  sense  of  one’s
fallibility  and  finitude,  which  can  nevertheless  be  combined  with  an  ability  to  be
steadfast in one’s currently best-justified judgments.”6
11 While in this and the preceding chapter of the book, Curtis does make some attempts to
strike at Rorty’s critics, he launches a concerted counterattack only in Chapters 3 to 5,
titled, respectively, “Critics: From Left to Right,” “Rorty versus Taylor,” and “Rorty,
Religion, and Public Liberalism.” Always fair and patient with his targets (and most of
the time managing not to cross the fine line between fairness and pedantry), Curtis
generally  manages  to  get  the  better  of  them,  pointing  to  the  inaccuracies  of  their
readings of Rorty as well as various problems with their own positions. He ends on a
positive and applicatory note in Chapter 6, where, drawing on Rorty’s own suggestion
that science fiction is “the most […] imaginative and most fruitful genre of long-term
political deliberation,”7 he provides a reading of Aldous Huxley’s utopian novel Island as
a more concrete illustration of a Rortyan utopia than Rorty himself ever penned. 
12 It is beyond the scope of this review to assess whether Curtis’s book will convince his
fellow virtue-liberals to go down the Rortyan road, but there is no doubt that they
should  profit  from  reading  it,  as  would  anyone  interested  in  the  philosophy  of
liberalism.  Most  importantly,  however,  the  book  is  a  success  as  a  work  of  Rorty
scholarship, and on many levels. First, it could serve as a good introduction to Rorty’s
specific brand of liberalism for lay readers as Curtis does a fine job at clarifying Rorty’s
basic  ideas  and  drilling  through  the  crust  of  misinterpretations  that  have  been
sedimented on these ideas in secondary literature. But even those who have a good
grasp  of  Rorty’s  basic  ideas  and  who  can  seen  through  the  misinterpretations
themselves  can  profit  from the  book too,  beginning  with  small  things  like  Curtis’s
playful, yet in its specific sense accurate, parallel between Rorty and Thomas Aquinas
(4)  and  ending  with  his  novel  idea  of  inscribing  Rorty  in  the  tradition  of  virtue
liberalism. Curtis himself stresses that that gesture is his attempt at redescribing Rorty
in Rorty’s own sense of redescription (4), and I would add it is a successful one.8 It is
successful  because not  only does it  lead him to some original  and striking insights
about Rorty, but also because the redescription radiates, so to speak, to the areas of
Rorty’s work Curtis himself does not touch on. 
13 To give you an example from my field, I have for years realized that one of the things
that  distinguish  Rorty’s  literary  theory  and  aesthetics  from  the  work  of  his
contemporaries is that he puts a strong emphasis on the psychological predispositions
of readers of literature rather than on the methodologies of interpretation (to Rorty’s
mind, in order to be a good reader first of all you have to have a certain inclination
toward texts).  But thanks to Curtis’s  talk about Rorty’s  virtue liberalism and virtue
epistemology (54), at some point in reading his book, I had a micro-epiphany, realizing
that Rorty might be redescribed as a virtue aesthetician too. Suddenly, I began to see
connections  between  various  dots  in  Rorty’s  literary  theory  and  aesthetics  that  I
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previously had never thought of, and some new dots began to emerge as well. Then, in
a still wider perspective, I began to notice a network of lines crossing between Rorty’s
aesthetics  and  the  other  areas  of  his  thought,  all  of  which  appeared  to  me  to  be
connected in virtue of their emphasis on, well, virtue. Fresh as this impression is, and I
cannot guarantee that, when the post-epiphanic dust settles down, the account of Rorty
as a virtue aesthetician will stay with me for good. But a kind of ephiphany that was for
certain: it allowed me to see what I have been working on for years in a new light, and
see some novel vistas of inquiring into it. Judged in Rorty’s own terms, this is precisely
what  redescriptions  are  for,  and  even  if  we  put  Rorty  aside,  such  experiences  are
simply valuable in themselves for any specialist in any field. 
14 Curtis’s book possesses many other virtues, but it is not entirely free of vices, at least
one of which is a function of a particular virtue. What I mean is that Defending Rorty is
generally quite well-researched, referencing both Rorty’s classics and quite obscure,
smaller pieces, which makes certain omissions it contains more glaring than it would
have been the case with a less informed study. Let me mention just two. It is rather
baffling that Chapter 6, which reinterprets Huxley’s utopian fiction Island as a concrete
description of a Rortyan liberal utopia (one that Rorty’s own work apparently lacks)
does not even mention “Looking backwards from the Year 2096”9 – nothing less than
Rorty’s closest attempt at… describing this kind of liberal utopia in concrete terms, and
at the same time Rorty’s only attempt at political fiction, with a nod toward Edward
Bellamy’s famous socialist utopia Looking Backward: 2000-1887.10 
15 Second, Defending Rorty never refers to the Rorty volume of the Library of the Living
Philosophers,11 something which I mention here not out of mere pedantry, but because
that collection contains some of Rorty’s final, at least biographically, statements on his
main ideas, including a few that are critical for Curtis’s analyses. I believe, for example,
that having spent so much time in his book discussing Rorty’s notion of irony, Curtis
should have at least mentioned Rorty’s reply to J. B. Schneewind, included in the said
volume, where Rorty openly disinherits his trademark character of “the liberal ironist,”
judging  his  portrayals  of  that  figure  in  Contingency,  Irony,  and  Solidarity,  as  “badly
flawed” and “misguided.”12 
16 But these are merely quibbles, and whatever other problems I might have with Curtis’s
book, my general judgment, which I would like to leave the reader with, is that it is
perhaps the most defensible defense of Rorty’s political philosophy ever written, and
certainly one of the most refined, patient, comprehensive, and stimulating works on
that subject available.
I would like to thank David Wall for reading the penultimate draft of this review.
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